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Downs, Yonkers, N. Y.; George Dana Graves, Cambridge, Mass.;
John Harold Sears, St. Louis, Mo.; Robert Hardy Strahan, Pal-
myra, N. Y.; George Newell Whittlesey, New Haven, Conn.
As this issue closes -our eleventh volunie and marks the retirement
of the present Board, we wish to thank those who have co-operated
with us during the year, and especially do we wish to assure Pro-
fessors Baldwin and Wurts of our appreciation of their kindly
interest and helpful suggestions. We are also much indebted to
the '98 Chairman, Mr. Charles F. Clemons, who has been very
active in furthering the interests of the JOURNAL.
COMMENT.
MALICIOUS PROCURING REFUSAL TO CONTRACT.
The doctrine enunciated in Allen v. Flood, (1898) A. C. i-that
an act otherwiselawful does nQt become actionable, because it proceeds
from a bad motive-is by no means new to English law. Stevenson
v. Newnham, 13 C. B. 285, 297; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Penn. St.
.308 (1855). The importance of the decision lies in affirming its
application to cases of malicious procuring of refusal to contract and
answering in the affirmative this question, "Is it lawful for one per-
son to interfere with employment of another where the acts of inter-
ference induce no breach of contract and are not accompanied by
either fraud or violence." Upon this point the law in England was
unsettled. Lord Esher in Temperton v. Russell, (1893) I Q. B.
715; Carrington v. Taylor, ii East 571. Nor were the American
courts in harmony: Walker v. Cronin, io7 Mass. 555; Roycroft v.
Taylor, 64 Vt. 209.
In England, Allen v. Flood must now be read in the light of
Quinn v. Leathem, (19oi) A. C. 495, where it was exhaustively
reviewed and explained, in part by the same judges. While in the
lattercase questions of conspiracy, procuring breach of contract, etc.,
entered, yet an intention is manifest to confine the Allen v. Flood
doctrine strictly to the facts there decided. Ia fact, this latter
decision negatives what would be otherwise a rational conclusion to
draw from Allen v. Flood and the doctrine of Huttley v. Simmons,
(1898) i Q. B. i8i,--what one may lawfully do, several may com-
bine to do-namely, that a combination with bad motive would be
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legal. It would appear that the contrary, qualified in cases of
competition by Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, (1892) A. C.
25, is the true position of the House of Lords. The Canadian
Supreme Court is in accord with Allen v. Flood. Perrault v. Gau-
thier, 28 Can. Sup. Ct. 241.
Thus far the American courts have shown little inclination to
follow the doctrine enunciated. The Massachusetts court in Plant
v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 and Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485 re-
fused to follow the English case. In State v. Huegin, iio Wisc.
i89, the Wisconsin court also disapproved of the doctrine and
declared it not to be the law of that State. -So in Transportation Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 43 S. E. 591 (W. Vir.), the principle wae
denied. While, in Passaic Print Works v. Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed.
163, the Circuit Court approved Allen v. Flood, the case in-
volved only malicious use of one's private property.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a recent case, passed upon
Allen v. Flood and also declined to follow it as regards malice,
although the influence of the English case upon the court's decis-
ion in other particulars is quite apparent. An organization of steam
fitters refused to allow its members to work with those of a rival
organization, the plaintiff, and through its walking delegate, Cum-
ming, threatened various employers that unless the members of the
plaintiff organization were discharged and its own members engaged
in their places, they would stop work and cause a general strike of
all trades employed on the job, an act which was within their power.
They further threatened to pursue this course wherever they found
the plaintiff's members working with their own, and thus to drive
it out of existence, but in no case were force or unlawful acts em-
ployed or threats made, except the threat to strike unless their
demands were complied with. The legal similarity, of the case
to Allen v. Flood is at once apparent-in both cases the courts
refused to notice conspiracy and it was upon the authority of that
case alone that the Appellate Division held that plaintiff had no
cause of action. The Court of Appeals now affirms their decision,
but upon somewhat different grounds. National Protect. Assn of
Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 63 N. E. 369. Vann, Bartlett and Mar-
tin, J. J., dissenting.
Although somewhat aside from the question we are here discus-
sing, the position of the court in reference to the legality of strike
in general, is too important to be overlooked. It takes the broad
attitude which is manifest ifn Allen v. Flood, the attitude also of
Chief Justice Holmes-that an indirect benefit, causing direct injury
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to rivals, may as properly be the object of a strike as a benefit,
obvious and direct,-a much more liberal position than the case of
Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33 (1897), would lead one to expect.
The following is from Chief Justice Parker's opinion: "I know
that it is said in another opinion in this case that 'workmen cannot
dictate to employers how they shall carry on their business, nor
whom they shall or shall not employ;' but I dissent absolutely from
that proposition and assert so long as workmen must assume all the
risk of injury that may come to them through the carelessness of
co-employes, they have the moral and legal right to say that they
will not work with certain men and the employer must accept their
dictation or go without their services. * * * Having the right
to insist that plaintiffs' men be discharged and defendants' men put
in their places if the services of the other members of the organ-
ization were to be retained, they also had the right to threaten that
none of their men would stay unless their members could have all
the work there was to do. * * * A labor organization is en-
dowed with precisely the same iegal right as is an individual to
threaten to do that which it may lawfully do." When the facts of
the case are considered, it is evident by this decision, organized labor
in the State of New York has obtained a strong vantage ground.
But the essential doctrine of Allen v. Flood, that motive is imma-
terial when the act itself is legal, the majority refuse to follow,
although Chief Justice Parker, with whom concur two other judges,
unqualifiedly takes that position. The Chief Justice's opinion,
referring to certain propositions of the other judges, reads as
follows: "I wish to again call attention to so much of them as
intimates that if the.motive be unlawful or be not for the good of
the organization or some of its members, but prompted wholly by
malice and a desire to injure others, then an act which would be
otherwise legal becomes unlawful. To state it concretely, if an
organization strikes to help its members, the strike is lawful. If
its purpose be merely to injure non-members, it is unlawful. I do
not assent to this proposition although there is authority for it.- It
seems to me illogical and little short of absurd to say that the every-
day acts of the business world apparently within the domain of
competition may be either lawful or unlawful according to the
motive of the actor. * * * But for the purpose of this discus-
sion, I shall assume this proposition to be sound." And upon this
assumption that motive is material but in this case proper, the judge-
ment proceeded, a fourth judge concurring upon that ground. The
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remaining three judges held motive to be material and vigorously
asserted that in this case it was improper and the means illegal.
While it would be impossible to lay down .any universal rule,
yet seemingly the trend of opinion is contrary to the doctrine of
Allen v. Flood and is to the effect that motive in procuring refusal
to contract may determine the liability. Yet one effect of Allen -.
Flood, worthy to be noted, has been to clarify the subject of malice
and force the arguments relating to its materiality in civil cases, pro
and con, to much sounder and clearer basis.
